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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

GENE G. SPENDLOVE, by J·OHN
A. SPENDLO\TE, his Guardian ad
litem,
Plairntiff and Respondent,

Case No. 8217
-vs.DR. S. W. GEORGES,
Defendarnt arnd Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All italics, unles·s otherwise noted, have been added
by Appellant.)
The Clerk of the District Court in numbering the
record on appeal has placed the transcript of proceedings
under one number, 67. References to the record, therefore, will be designated by the letter "R" as to the numbers placed on the pages by the Clerk, and by the letter
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'~T'' as to the various pages of the transcript. Also, by

virtue of the fact that the Statement of Points includes,
among others, failure of the Court to grant appellant's
motions for dismissal and directed verdict made at the
conclusion of the respondent's evidence, as well as failure
to grant 1notion for directed verdict made at the conclusion of all of the evidence, the statement of facts will be
divided into two portions for the convenience of the
Court, one summarizing evidence· to the conclusion of respondent's case, the other to the conclusion of all of the
evidence.

PLEADINGS AND ·JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
This action was initially commenced by complaint
(R. 4) filed by respondent on Octoher 23, 1953, in the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and for
Utah 'County, State: ofUtah, which /contained three causes
of action. 'The first cause of action alleged that the appellant negligently operated on the respondent on April
25, 1952 ; the second cause of action alleged that between
April 25, 1952 .and September 30, 195~, the app·ellant
negligently rendered improper post-operative care to the
tesp:ondent; the third cause of action alleged that between
April 25, 1952 and N ovemher 15, 1952, while respondent
was a patient, appellant improperly abandoned and failed
to give proper medical attention to the respondent. The
action was prosecuted by John A._ Spendlove, father of
the resp:ondent, as guardian ad litem, the appointment
being bas·ed upon the fact tha:t the respondent is mentally
incomp~etent and a ward of the American Fork Training
2
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~chool

(It. 7). r_}~he answer of appellant (R. 9') denied
the allegations of negligence and resulting injury and
darnage as to each cause of action, and affirmatively
pleaded contributory negligence and sole negligence of
respondent, and also sole negligence of third party or
third parties. Pre-trial conference was held on F·ebruary
2G, 1954 before the District Judge ( T·. 1), during the
course of which the respondent wholly abandoned and
dismissed the first two causes of action ( T. 1, 2), with the
result that the case was thereafter tried as to the third
cause of action of the con1plaint only, which alleged in
substance abandonn1ent of the patient by the appellant,
Dr. S. W. Georges, between dates of April 25 and Sep-telnber 30, 1952. During the course of the pretrial conference, respondent's counsel revised the dates between
\V hich abandon1nen t vvas alleged to have occurred to bet\veen approxiinately Septen1her 20, 1952 and N oven1ber
15, 1952 ( T. 3). The first date vvas further defined as
the date of a conversation, which will be hereinafter
detailed, 'vherein Mrs. Spendlove, the mother of the
respondent, was notified by appeHant that he was ill (T.
4). The terinination date of said alleged period was
identified as the date on which a release was secured by
the parents of respondent for purpose of placing him in
the out-patient clinic of the L.D.S. Hospital at Salt Lake
City, Utah (T. 4). Respondent's counsel likewise during
course of pretrial stated the specific claims which related
to the act of abandonment ('T. 21). ~rhese are reflected
in the pretrial order (R. 23) reciting the claim of respondent as: (1) 'l~hat the appellant failed to treat the

3
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responde·nt's wound properly or at all. (2) That appellant failed to advise with the respondent as to the respondent's condition, and (3) Tha.t the appellant failed
to advise the res-pondent as to the necessity of a future
operation.
The pretrial change as to the period within which
the abandonment was claimed to have occurred was not
reflected in the pretrial order, but this order was revised
by oral amendment at the opening of the case to reflect
the date change as set forth above (T. 30, 31). The pretrial order a;lso states the affirmative defense of appellant, which is in addition to general denial of negligence,
that the negligence of third parties. intervened and solely
caused any damage or injury to respondent, as follows:
That the father and mother of the respondent failed to
secure medical assistance from Dr. Clair Judd, who had
been associated with the case, and which was known to
them; that they failed to secure such services after they
knew that the appellant was confined to bed with illness;
that they failed to secure medical assistance fro1n any
physician practicing in the Provo area if the same was
needed; that they failed to follow appellant's instructions with reference to replacing wound dressings.
At the conclusion of resp·ondent's evidence (T. 121)
appellant moved for a dismissal of the action and a directed verdict upon the grounds detailed in the transcript, including failure of evidence to establish the sole
claim of negligence which was abandonment, and failure
of evidence to show any causal relation between any damage and injury and abandonment. In connection with the
4
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clain1 of the respondent as to da.1nages, it had been as·
serted during pretrial that there was, among other things,
pain and suffering in a normal mental sense, and also
that as a result of such pain and suffering the respondent
had suffered a mental up-set requiring a change in his
custody frorn the American Fork Training School to the
Utah State ~rental Hospital. The Court ruled at the
conclusion of respondent's evidence (T. 121), that the
rnotions were taken under advisement but that there was
no evidence of any causal connection between the mental
up-set and any claimed act of negligence on the part of
appellant, and that this issue of damage would be eliminated from the case. The minute entry of the Clerk (R.
59) 'vould seem to indicate that the court had dismissed
the entire third cause of action, the only ground upon
which the trial was based, which is inaccurate for the
reasons indicated. At the conclusion of a:ll the evidence
respondent moved for a directed verdict which was like'vise taken under advisement and the case submitted to
the deliberation of the jury, who returned a verdict in
favor of the respondent and against app·ellant, assessing
da1nages in the sum of $5,000.00 ( R. 55).
Thereafter, respondent rnoved for a new trial, (R.
61) and at the same time n1oved to have the verdict and
judgment set aside and judgment entered in accordance
with the motions for directed verdict which had previously been made (R-. 63), as well as to tax costs (R. 64).
After argument on April 2, 1954 (R.. 65), the Court on
~fay 5, 1954 (R. 6G) denied all of the appellant's motions.
5
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FACTS .&T THE CONCLUSION OF
RESPONDEN'T'S CASE
Plaintiff herein, Gene G. Spendlove is age 36. He
had been a ward of the American F'ork Training School
since 1931 (R. 49). He had at periodic intervals during
these years been transferred for confinement to the Utah
State Mental Hospital, although no confinement in such
State Mental Hospital had occurred within app·rorimately
six years prior to 1952. Mark K. Allen, psychologist,
testified that the respondent had an intelligence quota
of 76. and a mental age of 11 years based on tests the last
of which had occurred in 1951 (T. 119). For two weeks
prior to April 25, 1952, plaintiff had been with his parents at their home in Provo on an Easter vacation, and
was during this time (T. 49) under their care and custody. On this date in the late afternoon the patient was
seized with a terrible pain in his abdomen (T. 50), and
Mrs. Spendlove contacted American Fork Training
School, wheTe she was advised to call their family physician (T. 50). She then called Dr. S. W. Georges, appe~
-~ant, who came to the home and immediately referred respondent to the Utah Valley Hospital at Provo (T. 51),
operating upon him that night. The operation was prOtracted, and immediately fol'lowing it the doctor advised
Mrs. Spendlove that tlie respondent had a perforated
ulcer, that peritonitis had set in, and that respondent was
very critically ill (T. 52), a very serious condition existed, which the parents understood (T. 69). The respondent remain·ed in the Utah Valley Hosp·ital between
April 25 and May 4, 1952 (T. 51) when he was released
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and returned to his home. He remained at hon1e that day,
and the following evening the incision broke open and
respondent was immediately returned to the hospital for
a corrective and second operation which was performed
by appellant the evening of May 5, 1952. (T. 54, 55). Respondent, following this second operation, then remained
in the hospital for about five weeks, being discharged
approximately June 10, 1952, when he was returned to
his home. While the respondent was in the hospital following this second operation, appellant's father died in
California and appellant immediately left for that State
on or about May 11 or 12th (T. 70). During appeilant's
absence Dr. Clair Judd of Springville, Utah, cared for the
patient until Dr. Georges returned about a week or ten
days later (T. 71). During this period of Dr. J Uidd's care
Mrs. Spendlove discussed the case with him, apparently
by ca:lling at Dr. J udd's- office ( T. 71).
The father of the patient also knew that Dr. Judd
\Vas attending this patient during appellant's absence
(T. 93), and there was no objection on the part of the
parents to this arrangement (T. 72).
Following the patient's discharge from the hospital
about June 10, 1952, the parents of respondent, and particularly ~irs. Spendlove, took the respondent to Dr.
Georges' office ap~pro:rimately once a we·ek until sometime
in July or August when an abscess near the incision was
lanced, and thereafter they took the patient to the office
about twice a week (T. 72). No record was kept by the
parents as to the dates of visits to the doctor's office
(T. 72). About two weeks after the discharge from the
1
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hospital following the second operation, a cloth belt was
prepare·d for the patient by Mrs. Spendlove. During this
period ('T. 57), which presumably means July and August, the incision area. was running and had some red
bean-like projections, which appeared in two different
places (T. 73). Mrs. Spendlove testified that in late July
or sometime in August she had a conversation with appellant at his offices with reference to the costs of the
treatment and operations (T. 57), and at that time the
doctor instructed her to change the dressing on the incision every day and to bring the patient to him about
once a week (T. 57), which she did. About September 13,
1952, Mrs. Sp·endlove was again in Dr. Georges' office
with the respondent when he advised her that the incision
would require another operation and the expenses were
again discussed and Mrs. Spendlove stated, "I guess I
will have to .appeal to my Church" (T. 58). Apparently
on this date appellant gave her a prescription to he
sprinkled on the incision prior to bandage replacen1ent
(T. 76). Mrs. Spendlove, during a~ll of September and in
fact until the respondent was ultimately taken to the outpatient clinic of the L. D. S. Hospital on November 7,
19·5·2 ('T. 77), used this prescription daily, and likewise
changed the bandages each day. This daily treatment
with prescription and bandage dressing continued during
all of the period in which it is claimed the respondent
did not receive medical attention from appellant.
About s·eptember 27, 1952, Mrs. S·pendlove took respondent to ap,p·ellant's office and was told by Nurse Jean
Rowan that the· appellant was not avai~lable. Mrs. Spend8
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love stated to the nurse that she was going to talk about
the scheduling of a further operation with appellant,
and was then advised that there was no operation scheduled ( T. 60). Mrs. Spendlove testified that she was not
sure as to the exact date ( T. 79) of this -conversation,
though she thought it was the latter part of September.
It should be noted that respondent makes no claim
of improper operation or medical treatment of any kind
as to the foregoing doctor-patient relationship, and con~
cedes that the doctor in every respect fully performed
any a.nd all treatm.ent and obligation whi1ch he had toward
the patient. The claimed date of the period in which
abandonment is asserted to have occurred commenced
as of the date of a conversation with respondent which
took place three days later after the last conversation to\vard the end of Septe1nber, when Mrs. Spendlove called
appellant at his home (T. 61, 80). The telephone was
ans\vered by ~Irs. Georges, who advised Mrs. Spendlove
that the doctor was iH, to which Mrs. Spendlove replied
HWell, then, let's not bother hi1n if he is ill, Mrs. Georges,
let's just \Vait until he gets better" (T. 61). Mrs. Georges
then referred ~Irs. Spendlove to the nurse, and ~Irs.
Spendlove again said "J!ean, let's wait until the doctor
gets a little better", to which the nurse, Jean Rowan,
replied "No, he can't see you, but he will talk to you" (T.
61). Thereupon 11rs. Spendlove talked to appeHant. ~irs.
Spendlove stated that she \vas sorry to hear appellant
\Vas so ill, and he advised her that in fact he was very
sick and had pneun1onia (T. 61, 80). Mrs. Spendlove
further describes the conversation, (T. 62):
9
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"Then I told hiln I said the area around it
'
was getting more infected
and I said, 'After the
other terrib1e experience 've had had,' I said, 'You
can't blame me for being 'vorried' arnd he said, 'Do
you w~ant another doctor f' And I didn't kno\v
what to say. And I said 'No, Dr. Georges, I don't.'
Then he repeated, 'Well, I a1n not getting out of
this bed for the President of the United States.'
And I said, 'Well if I could just he assured he
would be all right until you get a little better.'
'Well,' he said, 'it has gone on th1Js long rurn.ning
that way, it w~on't hurt it to go a little longer.' And
I said., 'Well, all right,' and hung up and that wa.s
the end of the conversation." (T. 62)
From this time forward no call was ever made by
the Spendloves to appeHant, to his office or to Dr. Clair
Judd, who had treated the patient with full knowledge
of the respondent's family during the period in May,
19·52 when Dr. Georges' father's death require d his absence from Utah (T. 81). Yet his family knew how to get
in touch with Dr. Judd (T. 81). About six weeks later,
according to Mrs. Sp~endlove's estimate, the family of
respondent discussed with Gerald D. Stone, Bishop of
_the L.D.S. Church, the possibility of referring respondent
to the Out-Patient Clinic of the L.D.S. Hospital at Salt
Lake City, under the C·hurch Welfare Program. According to Bishop Stone, acting in behalf of respondent, he
called appellant's office about November 6 or 7th (T.
114) for the purpose of getting a release. He was referred by the nurse to Dr. Judd at Sp·ringville, who executed such release, which was then sent with this p·a.tient
to the L.D.S. Hospital (T. 115, 116). Mrs. Spendlove
1

10
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knew that the release had been secured and its purpose
(T. 82).
Dr. George Miller, who was on the staff of the L.D.S.
Hospital, first saw the respondent in the Out-Patient
Olinic on November 7, 1952, and on his initial examination
found patient to be in quite good general physical condition (T. 34), except as to the operative area where he
found a seven inch scar on the upper abdomen, and about
one inch to the right of the scar two small drainage areas
about 1 cc. in diameter, and a hernia with a stomach distention (T. 34). Dr. Miller probed the areas and removed
a small piece of cotton suture from the upper area,
cauterized both areas with silver nitrate, put on a dry
dressing and instructed the patient to return in two weeks
and Mrs. Spendlove to change dressings (T. 35). On
November 15, 195·2 respondent returned to the G'linic,
cotton suture was removed from each area and dressing
changed (T'. 35). On November 29, 1952, no sutures were
found by probing, wounds were cauterized and dressing
changed ( T. 35). 'On December 27, another suture was
removed from the upper area and an intestinal x-ray
taken to determine the state of the ulcer (T. 35). By December 13, the two areas were smaller. Dr. Miller described the infected sores as a sinus about one-half inch
deep, i.e., a surface opening which did not extend into
the abdomen (T. 38). He stated that it was not unusual
for pieces of suture to work to the surface at the areas of
incision ( T. 39). The doctor went on to point out that it
is necessary to cure the infection near the op!erative site
because of the danger of its spreading if surgery is at11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tempted (T. 37), and that there was nothing urgent about
this third operation u,ntil such time as this ilnfection was
completely cleared up (T. 42). He also pointed out that
it is desirable to let operative areas rest for sometime
before repairing an incision hernia to let the Inuscular
tone redevelop and the tissues return to normal to prevent difficulties in the operative p·rocedures (T. 43), and
that frequently a lapse of SL"'{ months to a year is permitted to let the tissues restore to proper form before
op·erating on this. type of hernia case (T. 43), although
that in his own practice he "\vould wait about six months
('T. 44). The doctor empha:Sized that the respondent had
a disruption of his wound to which such wait applied, and
that in fact the third operation later performed was approximately six months after the herniation had developed (T·. 44).
During the entire time of app-ellant's illness and
to the date on which Dr. Clair Judd executed a rele-ase
of the patient on or about November 7,1952, Mrs. Spendlove had daily changed dressings on the incision area
an d sprinkled the prescription given her by appellant
on such area. Dr. Miller testified, after his attention had
been directed to the fact that the last suture removed
from the wound by probing had been removed on December 27, 1952, that it wa.s entirely possible that the third
operation would have been performed about the same
time that it actually was performed, whether respondent
saw a doctor or not, and "It is questionable whether he
would have found all the sutures sooner than we did"
(T. 45). This question was then asked: "Q. In other
1
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\vords you are dealing with pure speculation~" To which
Dr. Miller answered, "That's right, mother nature." (T.
45 ).

Dr. MiHer was removed fro1n the surgical service
at the L.D.S. Hospital the end of December, 1952, but
did see the respondent again on January 17, 1953, when
there still was infection at the site of the incision (T. 36),
and he described the purpose of the L.D.S. treatments
as simp~ly to heal the two small areas as it was impossible
to do any further surgery until they were in proper surgical condition (T. 36). The third operation on respondent
\Vas performed at the L.D.S. Hospital on February 28,
1953 ('T. 64), and he remained at the hospital for ten days
thereafter (T. 65). About the time that respondent was
taken from the Hospital he grew 1nore nervous and it was
difficult to keep him in bed (T. 66). He was then taken
to the psychiatric ward of the County Hospital of Salt
Lake County for one day, and thereafter to the State
l\[ental Hospital at Provo, where he remained six months
and \Vas ultimately returned to the American Fork Training School (T. 67).
The sister of respondent, l\!Iarjorie Breinholt testified that during the four to six weeks prior to the time
respondent started treatment at the Out-Patient Clinic
at the L.D.S. llospital, he got thinner, had pains, \Vas
pale, inactive and tired ( r_r. 107). On cross-examination,
however, she adrni tted that he had been getting thinner
frorn the tin1e of the first operation in April, 1952, that
he \Vas critically ill in the hospital following the first two
operations, that he was pale during the period of his en13
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tire illness and that he had had stomach pains (T. 109).
In other words, she admitted that these symptoms. described had been present long prior to the time of aplJellant' s i!llness. The testimony o.f Mrs. ·Sp·endlove wa.s
essentially similar (T. 67, 82, 83, 84). No medical exp·erts., other than Dr. Miller, were called by respondent.
F AC'TS. A·T ·CONCLUSION OF! ALL EVIDENCE
There is limited evrdentiary confiict on matters of
importance. The testimony of the witnesses, including
medical experts, called by appellant, provided amplification of much of the testimony and periods involved,
and also estabiished with greater accuracy various dates
of consideration since the witnesses for respondent maintained no records anid understandably were uncertain in
many instances as to precise dates.
Dr. S. W. Georges, app·eilant, described his extensive
medical education, the fact that he had practiced medicine
and surgery in Utah since 1931, was in 195·2 ·Chief of the
Surgical Department of the Utah Valley Hospital, and
in 1953 and 19·54 President of the Staff of such hospital
(T. 12'4). He had been the Sp·endiove's family physician
since 1945 hut had never seen the respondent and in fact
did not know that he existed (T. 124). He describe:d his
visit to the Spendlove home the night of the first operation on Ap~ril 25, 1952, and the difficult and serious nature of the op·eration, since the stomach contents had
extruded from an ulcer in the stomach into the abdominal
cavity in great quantity, causing a very severe peritonitis
and adhesion of the bowels throughout the abdominal
cavity ('T. 127). He described in detail the operation

14
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\vhich lasted approxi1nately two and one-half hour~ (T.
129), and his discussion with the SpendloiVe famHy in
the presence of Dr. Clair Judd 'vho assisted in the operation following the same. (The Spendloves admit the
conversation with appellant, but deny that they re1nen1bered Dr. Judd as present.) In this conversation
he advised of the very serious condition of patient, but
that ~'so long as there is life, there is hope." ('T. 130).
lie visited the respondent t\vo or three times a day during the week foHo\ving the operation and while he was in
the Utah Valley I-Iospital ( T. 131), and also detailed a
stormy and difficult post-operative confinement for the
first week (T. 131). The doctor described the condition
of respondent at the thne he was re-admit~d to the
hospital_on ~lay 5, 1952, for the second operation, and
the fact tha.t the lower incision had opened with a serous
fluid draining. This second, operation was again extremely difficult, particularly since the patient had eaten
vast quantities of food preventing initial general anesthesia and requiring spinal (T. 133). He again operated
and sutured the incision, part of which sutures were of
cotton ('1,. 134). Dr. ·Clair Judd again assisted with this
operation and follo,ving the same, together with appellant, talked \vith the Spendlove family in the patient's
room following the operation (T.135). Appellant advised
the Spendloves that peritonitis had again set in, tha.t in
view of this fact and the previous serious illness, respondent was in a "very serious" condition (T·. 135 ). The
second hospita1ization continued from May 5 until June
10 (T. 136) and again appellant visited respondent either
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two or three tiines a day, except for the period between
May 11 and 22nd when he had to leave unexpectedly
and immediately for California as the result of the death
of his father (T. 136). He describes the fact that the
physical condition of the patient fO'llowing the op-eration
was critical and serious, although he was improved at
the time appellant left for California fT. 137). Between
May 22 and June 10, 1952, when respondent was discharged from the hospital, he improved, and at the fatter
date his condition was good, recouperation had started,
incision was healing and he was up and around from May
20th to discharge (T. 138). Both Mr. and Mrs. Spendlove
know of the fact that Dr. Clair Judd was attending the
patient while appellant was in California (T. 138), and in
fact Dr. Jud4 talked to Mrs. Spendlove daily about the
condition of the responiden t ('T. 193) .
On June 17th respondent was brought to appellant's office by :h{rs. 'Spendlove and was feeling well.
At this point the incision was healing, th·ere was no drainage, and the dressing was changed (T. 140). Nurse Jean
Rowan assisted Dr. Georges in changing the dressings
during ali of the visits whic:Q_later occurred, except for
a brief period when she was on vacation in July. On
June 21, 1952, ap-pellant again changed the dressing in
his office and a small spot on the incision, the size of a
pea, had develope·d which was starting to drain (T. 142).
Ap·pellant changed the dressing, cleaned it up, redressed
it and replaced the scultetus, which is a spe-cie of cloth
abdominal binder or corset designed to confine the abdomen. Appellant saw respondent at his offices again
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on June 24, and in July on the follo\ving dates: 1, 3, 8,
14, 18, 21 and 28 (T. 143). During July respondent was
eating well and feeling good except for the drainage at
the incision, points about the size of a pea (T. 144).
rrhe doctor dressed the wound and replaced the bandage,
sprinkling either a little sulfa po~vder or aureomycin
on the incision and replacing the scul tetus ( T. 144). In
August he sa\v him on August 4, 8, 15, 19 and 26, again
redressing the incision area, and on one occasion removed
a piece of cotton suture which had been used to sew up
one of the ston1ach layers on the second operation, an
occurrence which is not unusual (T. 145). The drainage
spot at the incision during August was doing well, but
still draining though getting less ( T. 145). Also during
the first part of August evidence of herniation of the incision began to appear ( T. 146), which the doctor described as a separation of the inner layers of the abdominal wall ( T. 146) .
The latter part of August, or early September, appellant had a conversation with Mrs. Spendlove at which
nurse, Jean Rowan, was present, wherein he advised her
that a hernia had developed and would ultimately require
another operation (T. 146), but that before, that could be
done the sore had to heal, that "it isn't urgent but this
has got to heal first" ( T. 147). Mrs. Spendlove complained about the cost, and was advised by appellant that
she had better consult the Bishop and see if they could
get help fro1n the Church since the expenses would be
paid by the Church, including hospitalization, etc. l\1rs.
Spendlove agreed that she would see the Bishop of the
Church and let appellant kno\v (T. 148).
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In September appellant saw respondent on the 2, 9,
16, 23 and 30th, and during this period he was progressing well and doing fine, although there was a small drainage still present at the incision ( T. 149, 150). In the early
part of September the doctor instructed Mrs. Spendlove
as to making a new body binder as the oJd one was cutting
the respondent, and the method of ehanging the dressing
and placement of a prescription powder on the wound
(T. 150).
The appellant described the necessity of a third operation, the fact that it is very dangerous to perform
such an operation when there is infection at the incision
site, and that it is customary to wait at least six months
to a year to permit the tissues to strengthen before again
incising (T. 151). The appellant advised Mrs. Spendlove
of the necessity of the third operation, but stated that at
no time did he tell her it was to be p·erformed within any
specific period of time ( T. 151). Sp·ecifically as to the
time of performance of the third operation he stated (T.
151):
"Q. Doctor, how often do you nonnally perform
that typ·e of operation after a hernia develops
of the type involved h·ere ~
A.

We usually wait at least six months, sometimes a year. The fact is these tissues being
under stress and strain, they are fragile, friable, they have no strength, if you repair
them too soon they will break out again."

Appel'lant described the effects of a hernia of the
typ·e here involved, as relatively mild, and the fact that
distention of respondent's somach wall was not very ex-
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tensive, but gradually getting a little larger, though held
in check with the binder (T. 152). He also pointed out
that where a perforated ulcer is accompanied with generalized peritonitis, the ulcer is not ren1oved but merely
closed, and unt,il such ti1ne as the ulcer was entirely
healed there would be pa.in present jro1n the ulcer itself
(T. 152).
By the first of October, 1952, the doctor had a cold
and \Vas in bed that day, returned to the office and kept
\Vorking until the afternoon of October 4, when he went
to bed again \vith pain and coughing (T. 153). An operation had been previously scheduled for October 6, and the
doctor perfor1ned the same, going home that day and
direct'ly to bed follovving a few office appointments (T.
153). By October 7, appellant had developed a severe
chest pain, a temperature of 103 degrees, with a cough,
badly inflamed and S\vollen sinuses, and difficulty in
breathing (T.153). Dr. Clair Judd vvas ca'lled on October
8, and he testified that appellant was severely ill with a
high ternperature of 103¥2, chest pains, rales throughout
his chest, lung phlegm, an infected sinus and throat, and
virus pneumonia (T. 196). On October 10, appellant
\Vas bedridden with virus pneumonia, high temperature
and other sy1npton1s, when Mrs. ·Spendlove called in the
afternoon ( T. 154). ~frs. Georges answered the phone
and stated that the doctor \Vas ill and that she did not
think he could talk to her (T. 154). After Mrs. Spendlove
talked to the nurse, appellant picked up the phone by
his bed and talked to Mrs. Spendlove ( 'r. 155). The conversation appears at T. 155, as follo\vs:
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''A.

I said 'Hello !Irs. Spendlove.' And she
' sorry you a.re s~c
"k'I
says, 'I' arn sure
.
says,
'Mrs. Spendlove, I am very sick, in fact I a.1n
so sick I have virus pn.eumonia.' And she said,
'Well, I run terribly worried about Gene.'
'Well,' I says, 'Mrs. Sp·endlove, I don't see
any reason why you should be worried, all
you have to do is change the dressing and
everything will be all right for a little while.'
I said, 'I am very ill, I just can't com.e out and
take care of arn.yone.' I said, 'Do you want
another doctor? I will c:all a doctor, or you call
Dr. Judd.' She got angry with me, she said,
'Dr. Georges!' and hung up, and I was still
holding the receiver in my hand. My wife
said, 'What is wrong~' I said, 'She hung up
on me.' That was the end of it.

Q.

Was an thing said about getting out of bed for
the President of the United States~

A.

I forgot that. When I said I was very ill, I

couldn't take. care of anyone, in fact I says,
'I can't even take care of the President of
the United States.' I did say that, I am not
denying it."
Mrs. Georges (T. 210) and Nurs.e J'ean Rowan were
p·resent in the room, and heard the statements made by
appellant to Mrs. Spendlo;ve (T. 221, 222). Both confirmed the statement~s of appellant in this conversation
as testified to by him, and both testified as to the abrupt
manner in which Mrs. Spendlove slammed down the re.ceiver ending this conversation.
When asked as to the condition of respondent at his
last office cal'l on September 30, 1954, app·ellant stated
that it was not dangerous (T. 186).
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From October 6 forward, appellant's illness continued and he was treated by Dr. John Rupper, Dr. Clair
Judd and Dr. Ellis (T. 156), and was attended each day
by nurse Jean Rowan. He was taking medicine of various
kinds, ineluding penicillin, streptomycin, aureomycin,
stearn inhalations and hot packs (T. 156), and the virus
pnPun1onia accornpanied with acute sinusitis continued.
On ·October 11, he was taken to the hospital in his bathrobe for the purpose of taking x-rays but was otherwise
in bed entirely ( T·. 157). He was not hospitalized as no
roorn "\Vas available at the Utah Valley Hospital. By
October 23rd the chest involvernent was improved, but
there was continuing difficulty with the sinuses, and
pursuant to the recornmenda tions of the attending doctors, who prescribed a warrner cli1nate, appellant went to
Phoenix on October 23, 1952, 'vhere he stayed until Novenlber G, thereafter returning to Utah ('T. 158). While
in Arizona, appellant continued under medical care.
During this en tire period appellant was too ill to
engage in the practice of medicine in any way and in fact
did not do so ( T. 159). He had, however, instructed Dr.
Clair Judd that "\Vhenever any of rny patients or my
nurse calls you take care of my patients." (T. 160), and
had also named as additional alternates in the event that
Dr. Judd "\Vas not available for his patients, Dr. Rex
Thomas and Dr. John Bowen (T. 159). AppeBant informed Dr. Judd, who, of course, had participated in both
previous operations, as to the condition of respondent
(T. 177).
While appellant was in Arizona, and on either the
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latter part of October or the first or s·econd of November,
1952, he called from Phoenix to his office an'd was. advised
by his nurse that a release had been executed relative to
resp·ondent entering the L.D.S. Hospital ('T. 162). The
doctor stated between October 6 and his return from
Plioenix, he w~as physically unable to treat any patient,
had not in fact treated any p·atient or engaged in the
practice of medicin·e (T. 159), and that the last time he
received any call from the Spendloves was when Mrs.
Spendlove got mad and slammed the receiver in his ear
on October 10, 1952 ('T. 163). Appellant treated no patients between October 6 and November 11, 1952 (T.
184).
Appellant stated (T. 183, 184) that under the practice in Provo, a doctor cannot make a patient take another
doctor, as that patient must be free to make a selection
of .his own choice.
Dr. Clair Judd was also called on behalf of appellant, and likewise described the first and seconid operations and hospital convalescence progress of respondent
( T. 195-). He described the serious illness of appellant
in detail from its beginning in late September forward,
and the difficulty in treatment of appellant because the
virus infection p·resent did not respond to normal antibiotics ('T. 197). Dr. Judd categorically stated that appellant was not, in his. opinion, well enough to attend
patients during any of this time (T. 197). He instructed
ap·pellant that it was necessary to go to Phoenix or a
warmer climate, since if he started working too soon with
the virus infection and colds he had been having, he

22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'vould suffer a relapse. Appellant had a past history of
virus infection difficulty in 1936, when he had been confined in the L.D.S. Hospital from January to August
(T1• 182), an element of concern during his present illness.
Dr. Judd described the instructions given to him by
appellant relative to respondent when it became apparent
that appellant was seriously ill, and likewise the custom
in Provo relative to a substitute doctor, at T. 198, 199:

"Q.

During this period did Dr. Georges give you
any instructions with reference Gene Spendlove~

A. Yes.
Q.

When was the first of such instructions, do
you remember~

A.

The first day I saw him at his home was on
the 8th.

Q.

What was his

A.

He told rne Gene's condition. Well, he told
me before, all along he had talked about Gene,
and I knew pretty well how Gene was even
without him telling me at that time. But he
again described how it was and asked me if I
would take care of him if they called me.

Q.

What did you say to that~

A.

I said I would.

(~.

Did you call the Spendloves at all1

A.

No.
Why not, Doctor~ What was the practice with
reference to that~

Q.

instructions~

23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

If they thought Gene ne·ede:d a doctor's care
they wou(ld call me. It isn't good p·ractice for
us to choose ourselves or anybody unless they
want us to come.

Q. Doctor, during this entire period when Dr.
Georges wa.s ill did you maintain your offices
in Springville, were they op·en ~
A. Yes.
Q. Were you
A.

available~

Yes.

Q. Were you at the Utah Valley Hospital during
that period~
A.

Y·es.

Q. How
A.

freqeuntly~

Eve~ry

day.

Q. Do you have nurses in your office there in
S p·ringville ~
A.

I ha.ve a receptionist.

Q. She is there during the day~
A.

Yes.

Q. You phone is listed in the phone book, is it1
A.

Yes.

Q. Both home and office~
A.

Yes."

Dr. Judd, testifying with refe·rence to respondent,
stated that it wa.s unwise to try and rep·air respondents
hernia in the p·resence of infection, and that practice
requires waiting for the infection to heal (T. 208).
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Dr. John H. Rupper likewise attended appellant
during his i~llness of ·October and e~arly November (T.
229). He first saw appellant on October 9, 1952, at his
home and diagnosed his condition as that of virus pneumonia with acute sinusitis (T. 230). On October 11 he
SR\V appellant Hgain, who was unimproved with continuing high temperature, and still bed-ridden. Since appellant was not responding to treatment, Dr. Rupper secured pathological studies during the week of August
12 to 18 and by October 20 appellant vYas improved somewhat, but was still bedridden and with continuing lung
infection and he was "physically unable to treat patients"
(T. 233). Dr. Rupper was concerned about relapse (T.
234), particularly with virus pneumonia, and recommended that appeHant innnediately get to a warmer climate for
better treatment of the respiratory infection (T. 233).
He again testified that the appellant was too ill to practice during the period in question (T. 236).
Nurse Jean Rowan likewise testified as to the operations perfor1ned on respondent and the method of treatlnent during the months of J'uly, August and September
as being that of basically of removing the bandage over
the incision and redressing ( T. 21G). She confirmed appeHant's version of the conversation "\vith Mrs. Spendlove
about the first of September 1952, when ·expenses were
discussed, appellant suggested they con tact the Bishop
and get so1ne help from the Church, and Mrs. Spendlove stated she would do so ( T. 217). She also described
the sta.te1nent of the doctor to Mrs. Spendlove that the
third operation c.ould not he performed until the draining
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areas were clear (T. 218), and lik·ewise confirmed the
statements made by appellant in the conversation with
Mrs. Spendlove on October 10,1952 (T. 22'2).
Bishop Stone called at the office after ap·p·ellant had
gone to Arizona and in the latter p·art of October (T. 223)
and wanted to know whether he could have the appellant
sign a release. The nurse told him the doctor was ill and
to contact Dr. Judd who could sign the release since he
had been previously connected with the case (T. 223).
Later the nurse advised ap·p·ellant that the release had
been signed when the appellant called by telephone from
Phoenix (T. 224), prior to his return to Provo and resumption of p·ractice.
STATEMENT OF' POINTS
Appellant relies upon the foHowing points:
Poin.t No.1
The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion
for.dismissal an~d directed verdict made at the conclusion
of the respondent's. evidence (T. 121). ·
Point No.2
The trial court erred in denying app·ellant's motion
for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of all the·
evidence (T. 238, 239), and in failing to give appellant's
requested instruction No. 1, (R. 34), directing the jury
to return a directed verdict in behalf of appellant.

Point No.3
The trial court erred in refusing to give app·ellant's
request for Instruction No. 5 (R. 38) to which failure
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appellant excepted (T. 244), and which reads as follows:
"In determining whether or not the defendant
properly discharged his responsibilities as a physician and surgeon in this case, you should judge
the defendant by con1parison of his conduct with
the standard of conduct on the part of the ordinarily and reasonably careful physician and surgeon practicing in Provo, Utah in the year 1952.
~ehe fact that the defendant may have conducted
hin1self in a 1nanner different fro1n the way doctors ordinarily perfor1n their services in other
comn1unities, if such be the fact, is innnaterial because the defendant \vas required only to exercise
such reasonable care, diligence and consideration
for his patient as was ordinarily exercised by the
ordinarily skillful physician and surgeon practicing in Provo, Utah in the year 1952.
"Therefore, if you find from the evidence in
this case that the defendant exercised the ordinary
and reasonable care, diligence and consider~ation
of his patients as was exercised by the ordinarily
skillful physician and surgeon in Provo, Utah in
1952, you must return a verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plain tiff no cause of action."
Point No.4
The trial court erred in refusing to give appeHant's
request for Instruction No. 9 (R. 42), to which failure
appellant excepted (T. 244), and which reads as follows:
"You are instructed that the sole issue of
negligence claimed by plain tiff in this case is
\Vhether or not Dr. S. W. Georges abandoned
the plaintiff in the fall of 1952, beginning on the
date on which Mrs. Maude Spendlove, Inother of
plaintiff, talked to Dr. S. W. Georges at his home
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and was told the Doctor was ill and ending with
the date on which Bishop Ston~ obtained the release from Dr. Clair Judd relative to placing
plaintiff under care of the L.D.S. Hospital at Salt
Lake City, Utah.
"·There has been evidence introduced in this
case re'lative to the operations performed by the
defendant on the plaintiff on April 25, 1952 and
May 5, 1952, and the care· rendered by him in
conne-ction therewith. Such evidence is not to be
considered by you as any indication that plaintiff
cLaims damage or injury resulting from either
of the two operations or from the treatment afforde·d to the pl·aintiff by defendant with respect
to said operations. Plaintiff ·does not make such
claim."

Point No.5
The trial court erred in refusing to give appellant's
request for Instruction No. 11 (R. 44), to which failure
a.pp~ellant excepted ('T. 244), and which reads as follows:
"You are instructed that in this case the· plaintiff Gene Spendlove was a .mental incompetent
and a ward of the American Fork Training School,
a public institution for n1entally deficient persons.
During all times herein involved he was living
with and under the direct sup·ervision of his parents, M·aude and John Spendlove.
"You ar~e therefore instucted that the defendant, DT. S. W. Georges, had a right to assume that
the parents of Gene S·pendlove would take such
action with reference to employment of doctors
·and seek prop~er medical attention for Gene Spendlove as would be taken by any normal person in
the exercise of reasonable care in his own behalf
under similar circumstances."
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PDint No.6

The trial court err·ed in giving Instruction No.5 (R.
49) to the giving of which appellant excepted (T. 242),
and which re~ads as foHows:
"In this action the defendant as an affirmative defense claims that the parents of the plaintiff were negligent in the particulars set forth
in Instruction No. 1. If you find that the defendant was guilty of malpractice or negligence, then
you should consider and determine whether the
parents of the plaintiff, or eithe:r of them, were
also guilty of negligence, and further, whether
such negligence was an efficient intervening cause
"vhich displaced the conduct of the defendant in
proximately producing the plaintiff's injury and
dam~age. However, if the negligence of the parents was only a concurring cause of the plaintiff's
injury, then you should find against the defendant
on this defense.
"The test by which you will determine this
issue is as follows: If the defendant foresaw, or
by the ·exercise of ordinary care would have foreseen, the probability of the conduct of the parents
of the plaintiff, and the probability that the. defend ant's conduct and that of the parents would
result in injury to the plaintiff, then the conduct
of both was the proximate cause of the injury.
But, if the probable result could not have been
foreseen and if the immedi~a.t.e cause of the injury
was the conduct of the pa.ren ts, then your verdict
must be in favor of the defendant, no cause of action. The burden is on the defendant to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence the above proposition."
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Point No.7
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 7 (R.
50) to the giving of which appellant excepted (T. 242,
243), and which reads as follows:
"You are instructed that where a physician
is employed to attend a patient the relationship
of physician and patient continues until ended by
the consent of the parties, or revoked by the dismissal of the physician, or until his services ·are
no longer needed. The physician is required to
exercise reasonable and ordinary care and skill
in determin1ng when to discontinue his treatment,
and where he fails to attend upon his p~atient and
terminates his employment without notice to his
patient and without affording the latter an opportunity to secure other medical attendance, he
is liable for any damage caused thereby.
"In this case if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant discontinued the care and treatment of the plaintiff; that
such care and tre-atment were reasonably nec~s
sary, and that the defendant failed to notify the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's p·arents that he was
discontinuing such care and treatment, or that
he was unable to render further servie:e, then
the defendant was guilty of malpractice in ·abandoning the plaintiff. And if you further find that
the p[aintiff suffere.d injury and dam,age as a
proximate result of such conduct on the part of
the defendant, then your verdict must be in favor
of the plaintiff."
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ARGUMENT
Point No.1
The trial court ·erred in denying appellant's motion
for dismissal and directed veTdict made at the conclusion
of the respondent's evidence. (T. 121).

P·oint No.2
11 he trial court erred in denying appeHant's motion
for a directed verdict n1ade at the conclusion of all the
evidence·. (T. 238, 239).
Both of the above two points are essentially concerned \Vith the fact that the evidence, whether taken as it
stood at the conclusion of the respondent's case, or of the
en tire case, fails to establish the abandonment of the patient by appellant, \Vhich is the ground of claimed negli-·
gence, failed to show any causal relation between any
such clairned abandonment and any injury or damage respondent might have suffered, and that if in fact there
\vas any pain and injury, it was caused solely by the negligence of the parents of respondent, in whose custody he
\vas at and prior to the time of alleged abandonment.
AppeHant respectfully asserts that this proceeding
is of the utrnost irnportance to the rnedical profession of
Utah as a whole, because the action of the trial court
in refusing to grant motions of dismissal and for directed
verdict has necessarily accepted a definition of abandonnlent which irnposes an unreasonable and unwarranted
burden on any doctor who is so stricken with illness that
he is unable to attend his patient, and an illness moreover, over \\'hich he has no control. Appellant makes such
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assertion fully cognizant of the fact that this court must
necessarily confine its consideration to the evidence of
this record, and in one sense its concern to the litigants
herein.
Much of the testimony does not directly tie with the
claimed act of .abandonment, afthough it does hear on
the question of the claimed nature and extent of the illness of respon·dent in the general period of claimed abandonment, and the problem of causal relationship· between
claimed negligence and any resulting injury.
Act of Abamdonm.ent

T·his record shows that the respondent and plaintiff
was an adult of 36 years of age during the events of concern; had been at periodical intervals confined to the
Utah State Mental Hospital, and had otherwise for many
years been under the care of the American Fork Training· School, and who, according to the p~sychologist called
by respondent, had the mentality of a boy 11 years old.
Two weeks p·rior to the time that appellant saw respondent for the first time, respondent had been in the care and
custody of his parents, the Sp·endloves, at the family
home at Provo, Utah. He had been taken to such· home
for Easter Vacation from the American F'ork Training
School.
The evidence indicates the critical} condition of respondent the night of April 25, 1952, when appellant operated on him for an ulcerated stomach at the Utah \Talley
Hospital. The operatio~ was of a serious nature as vast
quantities of food had poured from the stomach into the
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abdo1ninal cavity, and bo,vel adhesions had set in with
accompanying peritonitis prior to the time of this operation. As the appeHant advised the parents, the patient
'vas critically ill that night and for several days following
the operation.
Respondent remained in the hospital until May 4,
1952, having an initia!l storn1y convalescence, and on such
date was returned to his home. The record indicates it
was most difficult handling him at the hospital and appellant testified that ~irs. Spendlove told him on more
than one occasion with reference to the overall iHness,
that she 'vas "scared to death" of responaent (T. 149).
In any event, the incision ha.d started to pull apart
and had herniated following the first operation, with the
result that a second and again difficult operation was
perforined the night of May 5, 1952, with in fact many
of the complications of the first operation. Thereafter
respondent was discharged from the hospitrul in early
June and for a time seemed to progress rather well.
There was, ho,vever, a small external infection at the incision site 'vith the result that the doctor 'vas seeing the
patient periodically throughout the months of June, July,
August and September, at which visits the dressings
were changed at the incision site for the purpose of clearing up the infection before a third operation cou~d be
performed.
By late Sept!ember and early October appellant was
becoming ill, and by this ti1ne was bedridden with virus
pneumonia, acute sinusitis, high fever and other incidental and related ailments. If there is any fact clear
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in this· record it is the il.lness of the ap·p,ellant, which continued to November 11 1952 when he again resumed
' The' record contains detailed
the practice of medicine.
testimony of app·ellant himself and of his attending physicians, Dr. Clair Judd and Dr. Jlohn H. Rupper that a~
pellant was bedridden at Provo until ap·proximately
O·ctober 23, when he was told hy his physicians that it was
essential for him to enter a warmer climate since the
virus infection present had not cleared up in .a satisfactory manner and this was the prescribed treatment.
The· record is also clear, based on the undisputed testimony of all of the doctors who testified in behalf of app·ellant, which is uncontradicted in any way .by the respondent, as in fact it could not be, that appellant was
plvysically unable to treat any patients or engage in the
practice of medicine during this period and 1m fMt he did
not .do BO.
. · On or about October 10, 1952, a conversation occurred between Mrs. ·sp.endlove, in whose custody the respondent then was and who had assumed responsibility
·for securing medical care and assistance for him, and
appellant. In this conversation an·d based solely upon the
testimony introduced by respondent, Mrs. Spendlove was
advised and knew that the doctor was seriously ill with
pneumonia, that he was unable to treat patients, and was
asked by the doctor whether or not she wanted him to se·cure another doctor. The conversation as related by M:m.
Sp·endlove, Nurse Jean Rowan and app~el'lant included
this notice given above, but went further in that the doetor had in addition asked Mrs. Spendlove whether she
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desired him to call Dr. Clair Judd. This apparently is
the alleged act of abandonment, which is an incredible
assertion under the circumstances a;s evidenced by the
record. Before the return of appHllant to active practice
on November 11, 1952, the S·pendloves themselves,
through Bishop Gerald D. Stone, secured a release of
respondent for the purpose of placing him in the outpatient clinic of the L.D.S. Hospital, which release was
executed in behalf of the appellant by Dr. Clair Judd.
The record is likewise clear that the custodians of respondent knew that by this affirmative act they were
terminating all relations with appellant by securing this
release. AppeHant was advised of this fact while he was
at Pho,enix, Arizona, approxim·ately a week prior to hi's
return to his practice. It is difficult to grasp the theory
upon which the respondent attempts to predicate abandonment. It can scarcely he on the date of the conversation with the app'ellant, when the Spendloves were ·advised of an illness preventing practice by appellant and
further notified that appellant would obtain another
doctor for them if desired. There was obviously nothing
more that the doctor could do on that date whether he
desired to or not, and he certainly did all that could be
done by way of notice and offer to secure another doctor
that could be expected or was even possible. It may be,
and respondent has. never defined any date of abandonment either on pretrial or otherwise, that respondent
claims this act occurred sometime subsequent to the initial conversation, yet again appellant is at a loss to understand when the act occurred because he was physi-
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cally unable to and did not treat any patients at any thne
thereafter, to NOivember 11, 19-52, which was subsequent
to the date a formal release was secured by the Spendloves from Dr. C1air Judd. He was able to go to Arizona
on October 23 for further medical treatment and in a
favorable climate, and yet the· ·evi<lence is uncontradicted
he was still physically i'll and still not attending his. practice. In s·hort, the ·doctor performed every possible
obligation toward this patient during the appellant's
il,lness, and ther'e was obviously no abandon1nent within
any conceivable legal definition of the same. Since these
matters are without dispute in the record, there is no
basis whatsoever upon which this case should have been
submitted to the jury.
·There are relatively few cases that appellant has
been able to find which deal with abandonment resulting
from the illness of th'e physician, which are factually sin1ilar to the instant case. ~{ost of the decisions seem to have
been collected in an annotation "Liability of Physician
or Surgeon Who Abandons Case" appearing at 56 A.L.R.
819, s. 60 A.L.R. 664, and cases cited therein. There is
one dominant factor which appears in any abandonment
case and that is that the doctor without cause refuses or
fails to render medicrul assistance at a tin~e when the patient is seriously and critically ill, without n.otifying the
patient.
The Utah case of Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.
(2d) 208 (1937) is factually distinct in that it does not
involve the iflness of th·e physician, but of possible interest because it is the Ut'ah case on a'bandonment. There de3()
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fendant doctors had treated plaintiff for a finger infection
arising from contact with a barbed wire. The doctors
had operated on such finger and hospitalized plaintiff between 1farch 11 and 15th, 1935, on \vhich latter date,
against the advice of Dr. S. 1\:f. Budge, the plaintiff left
the hospital. He wa,s instructed by the doctor to return
to him if the finger showed any signs of getting worse.
It did, and, on :Niarch 17, the plaintiff went to the doctor's
office 'vhere his finger was examined and he was immediately sent to the Budge l\fe1norial Hospital at Logan for
treatment. Dr. S. 1\I. Budge testified that at that tim.e
plaintiff was in a dangerous condition and needed imInediate surgical and n1edical attention. Thereafter, according to the plaintiff, vv-hen the doctor arrived at the
hospitai he refused to proceed \vith any medical treatment until certain bills had been paid. The, plaintiff thereupon left the hospital and walked to the Cache Valley
Hospital a few blocks away where he arrived a few minutes later and where an immediate operation was performed by one Dr. Randall. The latter testified that when
he sa\v the plaintiff's hand and finger, they were in serious condition and required immediate surgical attent~on.
The majority opinion of the court held that a jury question existed as to whether or not Dr. Budge was guilty of
abandonment.
The physician involved was not ill himself, which
distinguishes the Budge case from the ins·tant case. The
court, however, at page 211, defined abandonment in general language:
HvVe believe the law is well settled that a phy-
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sician or surge~n, upon tmdertakin~ an operation
or other case 1s under the duty m the absence
' limiting the service,
'
.
of an agreement
of continuing his attention after the first operation or first
treatment, so 'lo~g as the case requires attention.
The obligation can be tenninated only by the
cessation of the necessity which gave rise to the
relationship, or by the discharge of the physician
·by the patient, or by the withdrawal from the case
by the p.Juysiciati'IJ after giving the p:atient reasonable notice so as to enable the p~atient to- secure
other medical attention. A physician has the right
to withdraw from a case, but if the case is such as
to still require further medical or surgical attention, he must, before withdrawing from the cruse,
give the patient sufficient notice so the patient ca1~
procure other medical attent~on if he· desires. ( Citations.)

• • • •

"In Mucci v. Houghton, 89 Iowa 608, 57 N.W.
305, 306, the court announces the law as foilows:
'If a physician or surgeon be sent for to attend a
patient, the ·effect of his responding to the call,
in the absence of a special agreement, will be an
engagement to attend th·e case as long as it needs
attention, 'IJIYile.ss he gives notice of hi;s intention
t.o discontinue his services~ or is dismissed by the
pa.tient; and he is bound to exercig;e reasonable
and ordinary care and skill in determining when
he should discontinu-e his treatment and services.'"
The Court, at page 212, quoted with approval from
the Maine case of Barbour v. Martiln:
"'A physician who leaves a patient, at a critical stag-e of the dkease, without reason, or sufficiewt notice to e.nable the party to p:rocure ano.fher
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1nedica.Z attendant, is guilty of a culpable dereliction of duty.'"
It will be noted, although again the language is not
applicable to the illness of a physician, that the law recognizes the ability of the physician to withdraw from a case,
providing "he gives the patient sufficient notice so the
patient can procure other medical attention if he desires."
It is likewise apparent from the language quoted and approved by this eourt, and the emphasis the opinion places
on the fact, that abandonment must oecur at a relatively
"critical stage of the d~sease." It is obvious that the in~
herent theory of abandonment is that it occurs suddenly
and unexpectedly at a time when medical attention is
urgently required and in such a way that the patient is
unable to secure other assistance which is then urgently
needed.
The case of Stahlman v. Davis, 220 N.W. 247, 60
A.L.R. 658 (Neb. 1928) is closer factually to the instant
case, although with ~a major point of distinction. There
the plaintiff, age 18, had osteomyelitis in the femur above
the knee. On N·ovember 12, 1923, defendant, Dr. B. B.
Davi·s, perfonned the initial operation, and later on
February 4, 1924, a second operation during which a
piece of the femur was removed. No cast or splint was,
placed on the leg until ~£arch 8, 1924. However, on F'ebruary 20, 1924, Dr. B. B. Davis became iii and went to the
Mayo CTinic for consultation, returning to Omaha February 26, 1924, whe-re he remained but a few hours. continuIng on to Arizona where he thereafter remaine d for a
month. While in Omaha for those few hours on F'ebru1
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ary 26, 1924, he caHed on his patient at the hospital, examined x-rays, and consulted a Dr. Herbert Davis in
whose charge he had placed the patient. At th~e t'ime he
left for the Mayo Clinic as well as for Arizona he wholly
failed to notify either the patient or the patient's father
of his intended absence, and the patient was taken over
wholly without h'is consent, or the consent of his father,
by Dr. Herbert Davis. In fact the patient and his father
were not advised of the absence of Dr. B. B. Davis until
March 7, 1924, when a Dr. Lord took over the case.
The court defined the duty of the doctor under such
circumstances ·as follows, A.L.R. page 662:
"When a surgeon performs an operation, not
only must he use reasonable care and skill in its
p·erformance, but also, in subsequent tre·atment of
the case, it 'is hi's duty to giv·e the patient such
attention after opeTation as the necessities of the
case dem·and, in the absence of any special agreement limiting the service or reasonable notice to
the patient.
* • • *
"We do not overlook the fact that the doctor
was ill; that his physical condition prevented the
rendition of further services. But his physical
condition did not interfere with or prohibit the
giving of due and ample notice of his diS'ability to
his patient or to his patient's father. Th·e clear
duty, under the circumstances, was imposed upon
him either to secure the patient's acceptance of
the substitution of his son, Doctor Herbert Davis,
or to give him notice so as to secure another physician or surgeon of his own choice."
Again the court emphasizes the necessity of a critical
condition in the patient, page 663 :
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"The record contains ample evidence wllich, if
believed, sustains the conclusion that, at the time
the defendant herein left Nebraska for Arizona,
the plain,tiff was in critical condit~on.
"The undoubted rule applicable to the situation is that a 'physician who leaves a patient in a
critical stage of the disease, without reason or
suffieient notice to enable the party to procure
another medical attendant, is guilty of a culpable
dereliction of duty and is liable therefore'. (Citation)."
It is apparent that appellant gave· notice to the
parents of respondent of his condition so that they could
secure another physician if desired, which is precisely
the action indicated by the Stahlman and Budge case~s,
supra. It is also apparent fron1 the record herein that
respondent 'vas in reality not in any critical condition
at the time 'Of notificat ion of the doctor's illness. In this
regard the evidence is clear that from the middle of June
until the early part of October the only purpose of the
visits to the doctor's office by respondent was to secure
a change of the dressing on the incision are~a, and during
this period also respondent was wearing a scultetus at
the prescription of the doctor, which was nothing more
than a cloth corset to assist in holding the stomach
muscles in proper place. About the middle of September
appellant gave 1\frs. Spendlove an antiseptic prepar'ation
to dust on the incision area and had Mrs. Spendlove
change the dressing at her home, visiting the doctor only
once a week. During this period there was an exterior
infection at the incision site and some small bean like
1
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bumps indicative of a hernia. By the middle of Septenlber, or perhaps a little earlier, it had become apparent
that a third operation for correetive repair surgery was
required. In this connection, however, the testimony of
Dr~ George Miller who was calle·d by respondent, appellant, Dr. Clair Judd (and there was no testilnony
whatsoever to the contrary) all indicated that so long
as infection remained at the site of the operation it was
not sound p·ractice to attempt a corr-ective opera.ti.on beoause of the danger of spreading the infection,. Also both
Dr. Miller and appellant testified that frequently such
corrective surgery is delayed for a period of six to twelve
months to permit the muscles of the stomach around the
incision to develop· and restore their tone and to avoid
dealing with what was described as friable tissue. It
is perfectly obvious from this record that during all this
period the purpose of treatment was simply to assist in
changing the dressings to the end that the body itself
vvould cure the infection and permit the third op·eration.
In fact from November 7, 1952 until the third operation
of F·ebruary 28, 1953, this is. essentially all that was done
at the L.D.S. Hospital, about whose care no complaint is
being made, except that the visits there· were from ten
days to two weeks apart and less frequent than they had
been to appellant's office. In short, and as appellant
advised Mrs. Spendlove and testified, there was no urgency in any illness that respondent had at the time of
or more accurately during the period within which respondent ·claims abandonment occurred. The additional
element, and underlying premise in abandonment cases of
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critical or serious iHness at the time of the active abandonment is in no sense present in this case.
The Stahlman case, supra, points out that under the
circumstances of illnes·s a doctor does not have the ability
to substitute another physician for himself. Thus at page

662:
"It is also to be remembered in this connection
that the facts in the record disclose that the defendant, by his excellent preparation and for
thirty odd years of successful practice, had acquired peculiar qualifications and special knowledge on the subject of surgery. In short, his
employment by the plaintiff was, in fact, if not in
name, the employment of a specialist or an expert
in surgery. It would seem, in view of the nature
of his employment and the circumstances and
conditions of hi~s patient, as shown by the record
'in this case, that to substitute for himself another
physician of but three or four years' experience in
the practice, without any notice to, or agreement
with, the pati~ent involved or those representing
him would be not only a clear violation of duty
but, in effect, to utterly abandon the case."
This statement above from the Stahlman case as to
medical custom is confirmed without contradiction in the
testimony of appellant and of Dr. Clair J'udd, both of
whom stated that having notifi~ed the patient of the illness
and the inability of the physician to attend any further,
the patient, or the individual in whose custody the patient
is at that time, alone can select another doctor for further
treatment, if in fact the selection is required because of
the illness of the patient. This would almost seem obvious
in any professional relationship, but appellant did nort
43
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stop with notification, he 'vent further in an additional
step not technically required at all, when he asked Mrs.
Sp:endlove whethe-r or not she desired him to get her
another doctor. When she replied "No" and hung up the
telephone, there was nothing he could do. As a practical
matter and as will be more fully pdinted out hereinafter,
we believe it immaterial in one sense whether the patient
actually saw another doctor or not, because t.here i.s not
one scintilla of evidence to indicate the necessity of arnJthilng further than dressing changes which Mrs. Sp·endlove, under instructions given her by the app·ellant, did
every single d.ay of the period, accordin.g to her own
testimowy.
Moreover, it is clear from the authorities that the
purpose of the notice is simply to advise the patient of
the inability to attend so that the p·atient has an opportunity to secure other medical ass istance. Appellant was
seeing respondent only once per week during the month
of Septembe·r, 1952, and the L.D.S. Hospital outpatient
clinic saw him only about once each two weeks when
he was taken to them in November through F'ebruary
1953. It is utterly without reason to contend that
respondent, or his parents who were responsible for his
care, did not have amply opportunity to secure: any medical assistance required. Yet respondent ntust show this
by a prep·onderance of evidence to establish one of t.he
essential elements of the ab-andonment.
1

Causal relationship·
Whether or not the act of abandonment occurred in
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this case is in one ·sense immaterial, since there is no
evidence whatsoever to establish any causal relation
between the fact that for a period of approximately 4
to 5 weeks the respondent did not receive any active
supervision by a doctor, and any resulting or adverse
effect on hi's physical condition, or that such lack of
attention in anyway added to or pro-longed any pain or
suffering.
The decisions on this subject clearly esta'blish the
rule that such relation must be. shown by competent
evidence, a burden of the plaintiff, and that it may not be
left to conjecture or surmise on the part of the jury.
Where, as here, the problem centers on the ne·cessity of
considering physiological characteristics of the. human
body \vhich are in the province of experts, the problem
is not one 'vhich is perfectly obvious to a layman, and
expert medical testimony is require·d to establish causation.
In Rodgers v. Lawson, 170 F. (2d) 157 (C.A.D;C.,
1948), an action for malpractice was brought against the
doctors for failure to use proper care in treating the
breasts of plaintiff following the birth of her child,
including a1nong other things an alleged abandonment
of the c~se. Defendant Lawson delivered plaintiffs baby
and undertook prenatal care, during which later period
she had a soreness of her breasts and othe·r difficulties
\vhich the doctor seerned to have indicated to her were
not unusual and to be expected. By five weeks after the
baby 'vas born, the breast pains had increased to an extreme intensity. Dr. Lawson refused to call at the horne
45
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and the husband of plaintiff thereafter retained another
doctor. This doctor imn1ediately examin·ed her breast
and operated on the srune the san1e evening inserting
tubes for drainage. The court of appeal's upheld the
lower court's directed verdict and stated on causation at
page 162:
"It is true that the evidence sho\VS that Mrs.
Rodgers suffered severe pain for an extended
p;eriod. But tHis, without more, does not evidence
neglect by the defendant. The pain wa:s obviously
the result of the pooling and pressure of t11e rnilk.
This ·common postnatal condition_ was, so far as the
evidence shows, brought about by nature, not by
the defendant. There is no evidence tha:t due professional care required the admini~stration of sedatives. It appears from Dr. Bailey's testi1nony that
the·pirofession recognizes both incision and drainage on the one hand, and the more conservative
treatment of symptoms on the other, as proper
measures. Early incision and drainage would
ap·p·arently, in view of the relief after Dr. Bailey's
incision, have lessened the p:ain. But it is not
shown that it was a departure fro1n prop~er professional judgment for Dr. Lawson to choose
to postpone in-cision until infection appeared and
failed to respond to the treatment with hot Epsom
salts and p·enicillin. It is common knowledge that
even 'minor' surgery is fraught with danger and
that good professional judgment at times requires
expo sure to pain rather than to the knife, that is
to say, leaving t·he p·atient to the restorative pr.ocess of nature, aided n1edicinally rather than by
surgery."
1

In Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P. (2d) 1021
(1938) it was claimed that defendant physician ha~
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negligently treated or failed to treat one Vida Edwards,
1nother of plaintiffs, during a period following the birth
of a child. She had encountered considerable difficulty
in thi's birth and ultimately died from septic toxemia.
The gist of complaint was that the doctor failed to properly diagnose her condition, and although he did see her
periodically during this period of illness did not see her
frequently enough nor make adequate examination to
determine the existance. of the blood poison. There is
an element, though in a different sense than in the instant
case, of abandonment in the claimed negligence. The
Court at page 1029 describes the type and quantum of
evidence required to establish a causal relation between
alleged negligence and resulting injury in a malpractice
caS'e:
"In the instant case it is difficult to find anything the attending physicians. did that the evidence shows they should not have done, or failed
to do what 'the evidence shows they should have
done.
'The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
apply. In this both parties concur. There is nothing arising out of the case that 'shows anyt'hing
the defendants could or should have done that
would or could have changed the unfortunate
result. The testimony of the father, mother, and
husband of the deceased might give· rise to an
inference that all was no:t done that they had in
their minds afterwards might or should have been
done. N othi;ng is indicated even in their testimowy
as to what that w·as. To have submitted the cause
of the jury would have set the jury to conjecturing, surmising or guessing at the possibilities as
47·
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to what should or shouJd not have been do11,e . .i\
verdict of a jury may not be based on such conjectures.. (Citations).
"In order to recover in such case the plain tiff
mus't show that in treatment of the patient the
·defendant physician did not exercise such care
and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by sk'illed
physicians, doing the s.ame type. of work in the
vicinity, ·and that. the· want or failure of the· required skill and care- wa:s the cause of the injury
complained of. That there might have been n,eglect
or lack of skill is n.ot enough. To pernti.t a cause
to go to the jury on testimony show,ing only poss~bility, or what might or could have happ~ened,
is t:o p:erm.it a jury to base a v.er'd'ict upon. conjecture, speculation or suspicion."
In Anderson v. N·ixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P. (2d) 216
(1943), plaintiff sought to recover judgment against defendant doctor for alleged negligent treatment which resulted in 'the loss of plaintiff's left leg. On N ovemher 30,
1937, plaintiff had received a puncture wound on his hand
from a coyote bite and a few days thereafter consulted
the doctor, during which time his arm and hand became
progres-sively wors~e. By December 10, his left leg 'began
to ache and the. doctor thereafter called on him at his
home diagnosing leg trouble as rheumatism. The condition of the leg became increasingly worse until on December 19, 1937, some neighbors took plaintiff to another
doctor who operated after discovering osteomyelitis of
the left tibia. About a year later, and in vi~ew of the. continued existence of the disease, the leg was amputated.
There was no expert testimony introduced showing that
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a physician in the exercise of ordinary care woUld have
known fro1n symptom·s that this plaintiff was suffering
from a blood infection and that osteomylitis. should have
been expected. The prov-er treatment would have been
bed-rest, good die't and to make patient as comfortable as
possible and defendant did not so instruct or direct the
plaintiff. vVhile the court held there was sufficient evidence of negligence to submit the case to the jury, it is
also held that under the circu1nstances the evidence did
not drsclose a causal relation with any dam-age or injury.
The Court stated a:t Page 220:
Plaintiff, however, based his case on the
failure of Dr. Nixon to recognize that ostemyelitis had set in by Decernber 10, 1937, and to treat
him for it properly by administering blood transfusions and operating in time. There was no
expert evidence in this case that if defendant had
done these things at that tin1e the condition which
caused the eventual amputation of plaintiff's leg
could have been avoided. No expert testified that
had DT. Nixon recognized the symptoms of osteornyelitis he could have alleviated or cured it by
using the ordinary skill, care, and knowledge of
a physician practicing in that vicinity. As to blood
transfusions, one expert did testify that it was
beneficial in blood stream infections, but did not
testify that had there been transfusions the end
result 1night have been avoided. Osteomyelitis
being a disease the cause and cure of which is
peculiarly within the knowledge of medical m·en
and not a matter of common knowledge, it is
necessary to have expert testimony on the· effect
of the negligence of a doctor on the end result.
In this case there was no evidence that anything
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Dr. Nixon did or failed to do after oHteonryelitis
developed caused the end result. In th·e absence
of such expert testiinony there is nothing upon
which a jury can base its finding on the proxi1nate
cause of the injury. A jury may no:t conjecture or
speculate, but n1ust have substantial evidence upon
which to ba.se a verdict. (Citation)"
Again in Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P.
(2d) 566 (1949), this court stated at page 568:
"It is fundan1ental that the burden rests upon
the plaintiff to establish the caus-al connection
between the injury and the alleged negligence of
the defendant; (Citations); that the court rnay not
permit the jury to speculate concerning defendants' liability; (Citation) ; and that the court is
required to direct a verdict u,nless there is e1.Yidenc.e from w·hic1h the jury could reasonably find
in favor of the plaintiff. * * *
"Analyzing the testimony to determine
whether or not plaintiff has sustained a burden of
proving a causal connection between the alleged
negligent acts of the defendant and the injury
to the plaintiff, we find that under the pres·ent
record the jury would be required to speculate
·and guess on too 1nany elements in the chain of
causation."
See also Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P. (2d) 257
(1931); Sm.ith v. Bea.rd, 110 P. (2d) 260 (Wyo. 1941);
Gray v. Davidson, 130 P. (2d) 341 (Wash. 1941).
U·pon the evidence before the court there is no basis
establishing any cauRal relation between the failure of
ap·p·ellant to attend the respondent and any pain or injury
of any Kind.
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After respondent was discharged from the Utah
Valley Hospital about June 10, 1952, he was taken to
appellant's office approximately once a week until sometime in late July or August. During the early part of
this period the doctor had recommended the use of a
scultetus binder for the ~bdomen (a cloth corset) and
was changing the dressin.g over the incision a.s might
be expected. Toward July or August it began to appear
tha:t the incision might again start giving way and there
began to appear a small drainage from an infection near
the 'incision. About this time, according to Mrs. Spendlove, a small abscess was lanced and thereafter the patient
visited the doctor about twice a week. Mrs. Spendlove
testified that about the middle of September the appellant
instructed her to change the dressing on the incision
daily, and to bring the patient in once a we:ek. He also
gave her a therapeutic prescription to dust on the incision. Mrs. Spendlove changed dressing ·every day thereafter until the respondent was ultimately taken to the
Out-Patient Clinic of the L.D.S. Hospital on November
7, 1952, which was after the Spendloves themselve-s had
secured the release of appellant from the case. The
testimony likewise indicates that at one tim·e in August
the doctor had removed a small piece of cotton suture
which had worked itself to the surface at the small infection sinus. During the month of September the doctor
would probe for sutures, clean the wound, put an antiseptic powder on it, and change the dress'ing, replacing
the binder. In essence he was only doing that which

51
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nfrs. Spendlove testified she herself had done. The evidence fails to disclose even any suggestion that anythling
else could be done, and affirmatively indicates that in
fact the only thing which could he accomplished wa.s to
keep prop·er dressings on the incision area to the end
that the body itself would cure this infection, which
would permit the corrective operation.
The infection is a n1atter of vital in1portance, as all
the doctors testified in detail as to the fact that so long
a;s the drainage confinued at the post-operative sit~e there
slrould be no further operation because of the danger
that additional cutting of the abdomen at this point
would tend to spread the infection, and possibly permit
it to p~enetrate to the /interior of the stomach. The infection had to be cleared up. The doctnrs also testified
that the corrective operation would not be p·erformed
ordinarily for a period of six to twelve months to give
the muscles of the abdoinen an opportunity to heal,
strengthen and solidify. In other words, whether there
had hee~n infection or not, the operation in all probability
would not have occurred until the time when it was actually performed in February of 1953. So far a.s the probing for cotton suture which rem-ained from the previous
operation was concerned, it will he noted that when
respondent on November 7, 1952 was taken to the L.D.S.
Hospital, and placed under the care of Dr. George Miller,
a cotton suture was removed, yet Dr. Miller continued
dressing changes which is ·all that had ·been occurring
during all of this p·eriod, and continued to probe ·at e'ach
of the examinations which were about two weeks apart.
52
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1\loreove.r, he testifie~d that a suture tends to work out
of the wounds. It seems obvious. that a suture remorved
as late as Decen1ber would not have worked up from the
'vound until this date as there were almost two months of
medical care of Dr. Miller before it did so, a fact which
he describes as. a probability. There is not one scintilla
of evidence in this record to the contrary.
The medical testimony, therefore, in detail and logic
affirmatively indicates that the fact tha:t the patient was
not seen by appellant during the period did not retard the
tin1e of operation, and in fact under the circumstan~es
had no rela.ti on to the. rapidity or the extent of cure
because the point was simply to permit the body to cure
the infection which existed. It is therefore obviously
i1nmaterial whether the doctor attended the patient during this n1onth or not, and particularly in view of the
fact that Mrs. S-pendlo:ve herself was doing essentially
all that a doctor would have done which was to change
the dressings. It is utterly preposterous. to assert that
the fact that the doctor did not see the patient for approxirnately four or five times during the m·onth adde~d to
any pain or suffering, rnental or otherwise, 'Of respondent.
This very obviously is a matter deating with the
relation of infection to operative procedures, and treatrnent of infection to cure the same. While it is not a
complicate·d subject, it is one which is not within the
purview of the average layman, and in fact must necessarily be controlled by expert testimony. It ~is highly
significant that the respondent made no attempt whatsoever t.o pToduce a single 1nedical U)'ifness to testify on
1
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this subject, nor any testiutony of any kind to indicate
anything which eould or should have been done, and
whidh would in anyway have affected the healing of infection.
What respondent did atternpt to do was to utilize
evidence of laymen which in and of itS'elf proved nothing,
and there is in fact no causal evidence from this source
in the record. Mrs. Spendlove testified that during the
approximate four or five w·eek period of ahandonn1ent
respondent 'had pain in his abdo1nen, was p·ale, did not
feel well and lost we ight. Mrs. Breinholt, sister of respondent who visited the Sp·endlove·s' home frequently
during all of the period of illness, attempted to testify to
the same thing. Yet on cross-exa1nination both witnesses
freely admitted that each of these claimed sympltonTs of
illness had existed long prior. to such period of claimed
abandonment. This patient had lost weight beginning
with the time of the first op·eration and his critical illness at that point. He h·ad during all of such period had
pain for, as app·ellant explained, the ulcer itself on the
interior of the stomach would not have healed and would
cause p·ain. The same thing is true of the other symptoms
of p:aleness, and a tire.d feeling which would obviously
exist from the two p·revious critical illnesses of respondent.
It is a n1at ter of regret that the respondent himself
could not have told the jury what pains and suffering he
was incurring during the entire period of illness and particularly the four or five week period of claimed abandonment, as well as that period of November December
1

1

'
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January and February when he was unde·r treatment at
the L.D.S.. Hospital. If ever a jury was left to utter
speculation and conjecture, this jury was when the court
submitted this case to them. In fact, the evidence so
strongly indicates a continued course of illness which
was unaffected by the failure of respondent to visit the
doctor's offices for four or five visits and which arose
out of a period of illness as to which there is no claim
of negligence, that the consideration of the jury on
causation can scarcely be said to have arisen to the level
of conjecture.
It should likewise he noted that the doctor told ~frs.
Spendlove in the conversation of October 10 that there
was no urgency as to the condition of respondent; that he
affirmatively testified as to the lack of any emergency;
and that in fact when Dr. Miller first saw the patient on
November 7, 1952 he described him as being in good physical condition except for the distention of the stomach
and the drainage at the incision area. As to the distention, the mechanics of that were explained by the doctor,
the fact that it was not painful, and that it was easily
controlled by a scultetus binder or a corset of any kind
which he had instructed 1\Irs. Spendlove to use and which
she apparently did use.
All of the foregoing is fortified by the treatment
rendered to patient at L.D.S. Hospital. Appellant was
seeing him prior to his illness once a we~k, yet the
L.D.S. Hospital staff saw 'him less frequently, which
would se~em an affirmative indication that either they
were not as diligent as appellant, or tha.t lin fact the pa-
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tient had 'sustained some recovery during the four or five
week period.
It is, theT·efore, submitted that there is a complete
and total lack of evidence to establish causation and that
in fact the evidence affirmatively indicates the non-

existence of the same.

Negligence of Spendloves
Among the defenses interposed to this action was
that of the negligence of the parents. Dr. Clair Judd of
Sp~ringville, Utah was thoroughly cognizant with the
medical :history of the respondent. H·e had assisted in
both opera.tio:ns and 'had actively supervis·ed the patient
for a period of one week whil·e he was hospitalized following the S'econd operation. The parents denied knowledge
of his p·a!rticipation in the operation, but they knew that
he was familiar with the case since during the week's
absence Mrs. SpendloiVe talked to him daily a;bout the
patient. On ·October 10, 1g.52, they knew that Dr. Georges
was seriously ill with pneumonia. There is no reason
nor excuse for the failure of the Spendlove family to
call Dr. Clair Judd, if in fact any medical attention 'vas
required, although for reasons indicated above, we doubt
this. They did not do so, although appellant in discussing
his patients With Dr. JUdd had in effect brought him to
date on the Sp·endlove case and requested him to take
care of the patient ~~ anything developed and if he was
called by the Spendloves. There is nothing to show anything did develop·, but the Sp·endloves did not choose
to call a doctor. Of course, the·y had no obligation \vhat-
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s·oever to call Dr. Judd, and for all appellant is advised
they may not have cared to do so. This would make no
difference, because the testimony affirmatively shorws
that the're were numeTous other practicing physicians
and surgeons in Provo during all of the time. In other
words, if in :fact respondent required any medical attention from a doctor it was as simple as p'icking up the
phone and calling either Dr. Judd or some other doctor
a:s selected. This then, assuming attention was required,
'vas inexcusable negligenc·e by any standard whi'ch might
be implied, and served to deprive this respondent of the
very thing which they complain he did not receive. It is
as a matter of law negligence which caused any injury or
suffering which respondent might have sustained.
The effect of the negligence of the parents, in whose
custody a minor has been placed, is indicated in Brown
v~ Dark, 119 S.\V. (2d) 529 (Ark. 1938). There in an action by the father for himself and a:s next fr'iend of his
rninor son, age 6, the boy had suffered a green stick fraCture of the left arm. Shortly thereafter the father took
the boy to Dr. Brown's office who felt the arm should be
x-rayed. They then went to a neighboring town where
a Dr. 1fcAdams performed an x-ray and together with
Dr. Brown placed a splint on the boy's arm. At the thne
that the boy was in Dr. ~lcAdams' office the doctor let the
father take the boy home on the promise to return him
to the office in case of any swelling. The father did take
the boy to the home but did not later return him to the
doctor's offiee for consultation. The father did, however,
consult thereafter with Dr. Brown the. initial physician.
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Swelling developed under the cast and ultin1a.tely a.n operation waE ~erformed by a third doctor when osteomyletis of the bone· develop-ed producing a Voikmann's paralysis. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed and the
cause dismissed by the court, which viewed the ne.gligence
of the fathe·r as the source of injury. · The court stated,
p~age 5·34:
"Our conclusion is that appellee has failed to
·support his allegations with substantial evidenee.
This is a case where a layman took chances and
experienced misfortune of a tragic nature. If the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied, the judgments might be sustained. But it does not. Medicine and surge.ry are inexact sciences, and physicians are not guarantors of results. Our vie'v
is that permanent injuries to appellee's son were
occasioned by app·ellee's own negligence or error
of judgment in not leaving the patient with Dr.
McAdams when it became ap·parent infection had
developed.
"The judgments are reversed and the causes
dismissed."
This case. is somewhat similar to the instant case
in that the p·arents of the boy who w·as unable to care for
himself them·selves failed to take any necessary steps
Which might have bee-n required, and did not return the
boy to the doctor for fu~rther examination. In the instant
case .the parents did not call or attempt in any w·ay. to
reach another doctor to attend respondent. It is. submitted that the negligence of th·ese p·arents is obvious,
although ·appellant must necessarily concede that the
same problem of causal evidence is present since the
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record simply does not seem to indicate in any way the effect upon respondent of the fact that a doctor did not examine him during the four o1r five we·ek period.
The foregoing is equally applicable to the status of
the ·evidence at the conclusion of the respondent's case as
it is to the conclusion of all evidence. The additional
testimony introduced in behalf of appellant does, however, amplify considerably the details, nature and extent
of the appell·ant's illness, and of the two operations which
were performed in April and May long prior to the period
as to which complaint is. norw made. There is additional
testilnony with reference to the conversation wherein
appellant notified Mrs. Spendlove of his illness in fuat
he not only offered to get another doctor but asked if
Mrs. Spendlov€ wanted to call Dr. Clair Judd. The
notice specifying the illness and the offer to secure me-dical assistance were detailed by Mrs. Spendlove in her
versi'On of this conversation. There was additional testirnony likewise introduced by appellant with reference
to the desirability and necessity of permitting an infection near the incision site to heal before further 'OpeT~a
tion could be performed, and ·also as to the necessity of a
wait to permit the muscle tone to re'Store. However, this
expert medical opinion had heen testified to by Dr. Miller
who wa.s cal'led by the respondent and whose testimony
was illtroduced as a part of the respondent's case.
In conclusion, therefore, it is earnestly submitted
that both of the motions should have been grante~d by the
lower court, based upon the uncontradicted testimony
which completely negatives any poss:ibility that an effec59
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tive ·abandonment could have occurred.

Point No.3
This error is directed to the failure of the court to
give app·ellant's requested ins~tructiun No. 5 (R. 38),
wllich reads as follorws :
"In determining whether or not the defendant
properly discharged his responsibilities as a physician and surgeon in this case, you should judge
the defendant by comp~a.rison of his conduct with
the standard of conduct on the part of the ordinarily and reasonwbly careful physician and surgeon
practicing in Provo, Utah in the year 1952. The
fact that the defendant may have conducted himself in a manner different from the way docto(fs
ordinarily perform their services in other coinmunities, if such be the fact, is immaterial because the defendant was required only to exercise
such reasonable care, diligence and consideration
f'Or his patient as was ordin·arily exercised by the
ordinarily skillful physician and surgeon practiCing in Provo, Utah, in the year 1952.
"Therefore, if you find from the evidence in
this case that the defendant exercise·d the ordinary
and re1asonable ca.re, diligence and consideration
of his patients as was exercised by the ordinarily
skillful physic'ian and surgeon in Provo, Utah in
1952, you mu·st return a verdict in favor of the
defendant and against the p1aintiff no cause of
action."
It would seem ·axiomatic in a malpractice cas·e that
the actions of a ·doctor be- me!asured against the practice
in his or or substantially similar communities. Thls fact
is of particular importance in thlis case, since there was
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expert 1nedical testirnony to the effect that in Provo,
Utah, when a doctor becomes ill his obligation is no more
than to notify the patient of such illness, and beyond that,
he is prohibited by professional eth'ics from forcing another doctor on the patient. In other words, the selection
of the doetor is and remains with the patient or those in
vvhose custody he has been placed. The court in Stahlman
v. Davis, supra, seen1ed to have affirmatively accepted
this professional standard without question and probably
\vithout a0tual testimony in this regard, and 'in fact 'the
Stohlman case founds liability of the doctor upon the
very fact that he did attempt to imp10se another doctor
of inexperience on the patient. This evidence, therefore,
\Ve feel vvas particularly significant in this case.
Notwithstanding this, and in the face of appellant's
requested instruction No. 5, specifical'ly covering this
point, the trial court refused to give any instruction whatsoever on the subj,ect. vVe are l~eft to utter conjecture
as to what standard the jury may have applied in this
regard, and the vice of the failure is that they may have
considered this point against a background of knowledge they possessed, baHed on experience in other areas
or states which may be inconsistent with the testi1nony
\Vhich had been introduced. Appellant was entitled to
have the jury instructed on this subject, and th~e failure
of the court to do so constituted reversible error.
Poin.t No.4

This error vvas directed to the fa:il ure of the court
to give appellant's requested instruction No. 9 (R. 42),
which follovvs:
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"You are instructed that the sole is'Sue of
negligence c}aim·ed by plaintiff in this ca;se is
whether or not Dr. S. W. Georges abandoned the
plalintiff in the fall of 1952, beginning on the date
on which Mrs. Maude Spendlove, mother of plaintiff, talked to Dr. S. W. Georges at his hom·e and
was to~d the Doctor was ill, and ending with the
date on which Bishop Stone obtained the releas.e
from Dr. Clair Judd rel-ative to placing plaintiff
rmder care of the L.D.S. Hospital at Salt Lake
City, Utah.
"·There has been evidence introduced in this
case relative to. the operations pHrrormed by the
defendant on th·e plaintiff on Ap.ril 2·5, 1952 and
May 5, 1952, and the care rendered by him in connecii!on there·with. 'Such evidence is not to be
considered by you as any indication that plaintiff
claims damage or injury resulting from either of
the t\vo operations or from the treatment afforded to the plaintiff by defendant with respect
to said operations. Plaintiff does n'ot make such
claim."
Appellant's requested instruction No. 9 set forth
ruhove was intended to eonfine the attention of the~ jury
on the issue of negligence to a spe~ific period, and to advise them that there was no claim of any improper m·edical diagnosis, p·erform'ance of the op:erations or postop·er:ative treatment outside orf such period. Appellant
believes this to be of the utmost importance in this particular case, because of the fact that there was evidence
of herni·rution 'Of ·an incision. Be~cause the issue was confine~d to abandonment in a particular period, ap·pellant
did not attempt to introduce expert medical testimony
as to why the herniation occurred or whether in faGt there
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,,·as anything unusual, or to negative the possible thought
that this represented the result of any dereliction of duty
of the appellant. The importance of this type of instruction 'vas that an incision had in fact he-rniated, which
to the uneducated lay1nan might in and of itself indi'Cate
negligence, a pot en tia.l to be avoided because a jury might
in its ·own Inind decide that 'vhile there was no abandonInent son1ething was wrong with the opera:tional procedure. Appellant "\Vas entitled to such an instruction, yet
the court itself does not in any "\vay deal with the specific
problem and the only reference to the period is found in
its Instruction No.1 (R. 47) which is simply the opening
summary of the claims of each of the parties. There is
not the slightest admonition to the jury relative to the
prior period of treatment and particularly the manner
of pe·rfor1na.nce of the two prior operations, and certainly
appellant was entitled to have this period of abandonment
clearly defined not only as establishing the beginning and
end of the period but excluding other periods irrelevant
under the issues. This failure constituted prejudicial
and reversible error, particularly since the requested
instruction tied directly to the theory upon which defense
of the action was based.
Poilnts Nos. 5 and 6
'~rhese

t\vo points will be considered together, since

they are related. Point No. 5 refers to the failure of the
court to give appellant's requested instruction No. 11 (R.
44), and Point No. 6 to the error of the court in giving
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its instruction No. 5 (R. 49). The reque'St and the instruction read as follow'S:
Ap~pellant' s

requested instruction No. 11

"You are instructed that in this case the plaintiff Gene 'Spendlove was a mental incomp·etent and
a ward of the American Fork Training School,
a public institution for mentally deficient persons.
During all times herein involved he was living
with an·d under the· dire'ct sup·ervision of his parents, Maude ~and John Spendlove.
"You are therefore instructed that the defendant, Dr. S. W. George'S, had a right to assu1ne
thart the parents. of Gene Spendlove would take
'Such action with reference to employment of doctors ~and seek proper medical attention for Gene
Sp·endlove as would be t~aken by any normal person in the exercise of reasonable care in his own
behalf under similar circumstanees."

The court's instruction No.5
"In this action the defendant as an affinnative defen1se -claims thrat the parents of the plaintiff were n~egligent in the particul,ars se't forth in
Instruction No. 1. If you find that the defendant
was guilty of malpractice or negligence, then you
should consider an·d determine whether the parents of the plaintiff, or either of them, were al'So
guilty of negligence, and furthHr, whether such
negligence wa:s an efficient intervening cause
whi!ch displace:d the conduCit of the defendant in
proximately producing the plaintiff~s injury and
damage. However, if the negligence of the parents
wa'S only a concurring cause of the plain'tiff's injury, then you should find against the defendant
on this defense.
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"The test by which you will determine this
iS'sue i'S as follows: If the defendant foresaw, or
by the exercise of ordinary care would ha~e foreseen, the probability of the conduct of the p·arents
of the plaintiff, and the probability th!a.t the defendant's conduct and that of the parents would
result in injury to the plaintiff, then the conduct
of both was the proximate cause of the injury.
But, if the probable result could not have been
foreseen and if the immediate cause of the injury
was the conduet of the parents, then your verdict
rnust be in favor of the defendant, no cause of
action. The burden is on the defendant to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence· the above
proposition.''
Appellant's requested instruction No. 11 set forth
above, advises the jury that the appellant had a right to
assume that the Spendloves would t~ake such action with
reference to the en1ployment of other doctors as would
he taken by any normal pe-rson in the exercise of reasonable care in his own behalf, in similar circumstances.
This is a logical request and an important facet of this
case, because this was an assumption tha1t the doctor wa:s
entitled to make, particularly in view of the mental incapacity of the respondent. It defines a part of the rela;tion between the Spendloves and their respondent son,
and affirmatively tells the jury that the parents are not
strangers to this case, but individual's who have a definite
obligation relative to 'the matter of securing and a.rr'anging for medical assistance, if it is required. However the
court, in a studious attempt to avoid reference to the actions of the parents, fails to ins·truct the jury in this regard. ~foreover, it directly rel·ates to the appellant's
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possible action·s in view of the medieal testimony stating
that in Provo, U'tah, professional ethics p~revented a
physic~an from forcing a patient to accept another physician, and affirmatively showing that the most he can
do ~s to advise either the patient or his custodian of an
inrubilily to artJtend beeause of illness, pe~rhaps offer to
secure other medical russistance, and to thereafter leave
the matter to the patient or his parents.
The instruction given by the court imposes a d~stinct
ly different duty, however, and in effect des!troys the
right of the physician to make such assumption and
forces him into a guessing gam'e rus to what action the
p~aren1ts Iillgh t take, . eve·n in the face of their positive
knowledge of the physician's illness preventing him fron1
attending :any p·atient or engaging in any way in his practice. Thi'S is so because the instruction states that if the
ap·pellant foresaw, or should have foreseen, that the
probability of the conduct of the p·arents of the respondent would result rn injury to the patient, the:n that would
unite with his actions a.nd both would be the prorimate
cause. It then goes on to add that if the probable r~sult
could not have been foreseen, and ·the :actions of the parents were the immediate cause of injury, then the jury
shall find for app·ellant. The physioian should be allowed to assume that the p'arent s will act as reasonable
individuals in securing medical assis·tance, but the instruction in effect forces him to psychoanalyz-e the parents to ·determine what these particular individuals might
do under ·the circumstances. It would impose an un-:reasonwble and unwarranted burden so f.ar as the instant
1
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case is concerned, particularly when it is e st8.Jblishing a
general obligation of the physician not to one case but
to a tremendous number which may be pending in his
practice at a time when he is stricken with illne ss. The
only logical ·and reasonable rule of law to be applied
would permi·t the physician to assume that his P'atients
will .a;ct as a re aJsonable m'an would act under th·e circumstances, and not forcing him into a posrtion of trying
to anticipate the actions they might take.
.A!ppellant asserts that this di,stortion of the duty of
the physician tovvard his patient is extremely prejudicial,
contrary to the theory on which the defense was in part
conducted, and since it n1ust have influenced the jury,
prejudicial and reversible error.
1

1

1

Point No. 7
T·his point is directed to the Court's Instruction No.
7 (R. 50), to which appellant excepted (T. 242, 243). The
instruction attempted to define the act of abandonment,
and reads as follows :
"You are instructed that where a physician
is employed to attend a patie·nt the relationship of
physician and p·atient continues until ended by the
consent of the p'arties, or revoked by the dismissal
of the physici:an, or until his service s are no longer
needed. The physician is required to eX'ercise reasona;ble and ordinary eare· and skill in determining
when to diseont1nue his treatrnent, and where he
fails to attend upon his pa:tient an d t:ermin,ates
hi1s employment without notice to his p atient and
without affording the latter an OiJ?'portun'ity 'to secure other medieal attendance, he is liable for any
damage caused thereby.
67
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"In this cage if you find fro1n a preponderance of the e·vidence that the defendant discontin.
ued the care and treatmen~t of the p lainfiff; that
such care and tre:a.tn1ent was reasonably necess·ary, and th•a:t th·e defendant failed to notify the
p;laintiff or the plaintiff's parents th'aJt he 'vas
d!i,scontinuing such care and treatment, or that he
was un~abl·e to render further Hervice, then the
defendant wa.s guilty of malpractice in abandoning the pluintiff. And if you furthe-r find that the
plaintiff suffered injury an·d damage as a proximate result of such eonduct on the p'art of the defendant, then your verdict must be in favor of the
plaintiff.''
1

·The one s:alient f1aet with reference to the. claimed
abantlonment was the undisputed illnes's of the appellant
during the period in which the abandonm·en't i'S claimed
to have occurred. Yet the· instruction does not in any
way mention such illness, but simply se't's forth an abstract proposition of 11aw which s·eems to llave been taken
from the ca:se of Ricks v. Budge, supra, and which is of
limite·d assistance to the jury.
The court undoubttedly h-ad difficulty in fr'aming this
instruction because it is impos'Sible to do so upon facts
as to wh!ich there is ·any dispute. In the second paragraph
of the instruction ap·pears. the follo1wing:
" ... that 'the defendant failed to notify the
or the plain·tiff's p·arents that he was discontinuing such care and treatment, or that he was
unablle to render further service, then the defendant was guilty of malpractice- in abandoning the
pl'Rin't!iff."
plain~tiff

Yet the testimony indicates without dispute that the
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appellant notified Mrs. Spendlove of his serious illness,
his inability to trea:t the patient, and even offered to get
another doetor. The requirem'ents of the appellan~t's duty
had 'apparently been fully sntisfied, yet it must have
1nystified and confused the jury to find th~s instruction
to be applied against the undisputed testimony, and ~n
implication that the notice received by the parents was
inadequate, and that something 'addi~tional or different
\Vas required. If the 'COurt fel~t that something more was
required, it 'Shoul d have made that fa~ct clear to the jury
and indicated just what might he involved in such /additional notice. In all events it should have tied the facts
of this case to its definition of 'abandonment. Moreover,
the instruction deal~s needlessly in unrelat·ed and abstract
legalities. For example, in the first paragraph it states
1

"r~ehe phys~ician

is required to exercise reasonable and ordinary care :and skill in determining
\Vhen to discontinue his treatment ... "
This 'vould s.ee1n to he an indication on the: part of
tne court that there w'as somehow an issue on this before
the jury, and that there was an element of volition on t.he
part of the doctor in determining that his services were
no longer require'd. Tt would he npplicable to a situation
\vhere the physician si1nply ceases treatment although he
is perfectly capable of continuing it if desired. That is
distin~ctly contrary to the facts of this ease, where the
physician was so ill he could not continue his pract'ice
whether he wanted to or not. There is no issue before the
jury on this stated rule of law and no reason why the
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court shoul1d have given it since it could obviously cause a
conjecture on their p1art whicl1 had no place in this cruse.
Again, there is an illustration of the cour,t's approach to
its instructions by the use o.f broad generalities of law,
cor~ect in ·an academic sense, b11:t totally unre}ated
to the ea:se. Unfortunately juries are not concerned with
a legal education but in reaching a deersion on the facts
of a case under the specific instructions of the court.
Statements of l·aw unrelate d to the facts can only le'ad
to confusion, uncertainty, and error.
1

CONCLUSION
Respondent has wholly failed in his attempt to est31blish the fact of abandonment, the bur,den of which he nee.ess~arily assumed. The undisputed evidence shows thrut
when ~the app·ell'ant became so ill that he could no longer
continue the p~ract!ce of medicine, the parents orf respondent. were notified of this fact, and of an offer to secure
other medic1al ·ass'istance if they desired, a choice necessarily left to them. Ap,art from the f·act that the appellant fulfille·d every requirement of the lruw o.f abandonment 'SO far as notice was concerned, the evidence further
failed to show the existence of an e1nergency or pressing
need for medrcial service~s,. which is an additional elen1ent
of abandonment. Moreover, there was not one scintilla
of evidence to establish any causal relation between the
·allege~d abandonment, even it if had been es taJblished,
and ·any pain or suffering of respondent, directly or indireetly. The jury could do nothing more than engage
in the vaguest conjecture and surmis-e.

1
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The instructions were essentially generalities of law
which were not only of limited as~sistance ·to the jury, but
tended to confuse ratheT than to establish a set of standards by which the evidence -could be adjudge·d by applicable legal princi})les. They consistently rejected the
theory of the case which appellant was entl:tled to have
submitted, if in fact there was any ba:sis upon which to
submit the cause to the jury.
Appelant submits that the trial court erred in the
various rulings and acts set forth under the points herein
presented and argued.
Respectfully submitted,

EARL J. GROTH and
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY
&SNOW
Attorneys for Appellan-t.

Dated Septernber 8, 1954.
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